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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

Case No.
14136

-vsVICKIE LYNN SHUPE,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a conviction on a charge
of distribution of a controlled substance for value
in violation of Utah Code Annotated Section 58-37-8
(1) (a) (ii) (1953) as amended.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Respondent seeks an affirmance of the trial
court decision finding the appellant guilty of distribution of a controlled substance in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1) (a) (ii) (1953), as amended.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an affirmance of the lower
court's conviction of the defendant-appellant.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
On July 16/ 1974, an undercover narcotics
agent, Carolyn McPhee, was employed in the area of
2nd South and 5th West.

(Tr. 9,12)

The agent was

employed in this particular area for the purpose of
purchasing some heroin.

(Tr. 26)

While the agent was walking in the area of
2nd South and 5th West she observed the appellant/
Vickie Shupe standing in front of the Central Warehouse
building.

(Tr. 12) . The agent testified that she

recognized the appellant and knew her from a few
past acquaintances.

(Tr. 12,21)

They said hello

to each other, and the appellant then asked the undercover agent, "Did you come to cop" (Tr. 13)

This

phrase was interpreted as meaning, did you come to
purchase any kind of dope*
agent replied "Yes".

(T. 13)

(Tr. 14)

The undercover

The appellant solicited

a buyer for heroin of her own mind and free will,
without any inducements from the undercover agent.
The undercover agent did not ask the appellant of a
place to buy heroin.

(Tr. 26)

The undercover agent and the appellant then
walked to the Baywood Hotel and entered a room on the
first floor.

(Tr. 14)

The appellant then introduced

the agent to a woman in the room by the name of Pat.
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(Tr. 15)

The agent then gave the appellant money

for the purchase of drugs, the appellant in turn
gave it to Pat.

Pat then gave the appellant a ballon

baggie and the appellant in turn gave the baggie to
the agent.

(T. 15)

The appellant then walked over to a dresser
in the room, opened the drawer and took out heroin \
paraphenalia, including a spoon, a syringe, cotton
and some matches,for the undercover agent to use.
(T. 16)
The undercover agent then requested to leave
the hotel room.

(Tr. 16,17).

Shortly thereafter,

appellant was arrested for the unlawful sale of a
controlled substance.

There was no evidence to show

that the appellant was ever specifically employed as
an agent for the undercover agent.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANT'S CLAIM THAT SHE WAS ACTING AS AN
AGENT FOR THE UNDERCOVER AGENT IS NOT SUPPORTED BY
THE FACTS AND DOES NOT MEET THE STANDARD OF AGENCY
UNDER UTAH LAW.
In State v. Shultz, 28 Utah 2d 240f 501 P.2d
106, (1972), this court described the defense of agency
as follows:
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"The defendant having been charged
with the selling of a narcotic drug
rather than being in possession of the
same raises an issue under the facts
of this case as to whether or not the
defendant was an agent of the enforcement
officer. The facts would support the
proposition that defendant was induced
by the enforcement officer to procure
the controlled substance as the sole
agent of the officer, and that the
defendant had had no prior association
with the seller nor was he acting in
concert with the seller in the transaction. The record would also support
the proposition that the defendant
did not profit from the transaction."
Ld. at 241.
The critical considerations for the defense
of agency are:
1.

The defendant must be induced by the

enforcement officer to procure the controlled substance.
*•

2.

The defendant has no prior association

with the seller.
3.

The defendant is not acting in concert

with the seller.
4.

The defendant did not profit from the

transaction.
The appellant in the instant case does not
meet the above standard of agency.
There is sufficient evidence to support a
finding that the appellant in this case was not induced to procure druges for the enforcement officer.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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In fact, the appellant/ of her own mind and free will
solicited the narcotics buy.

(Tr. 13)

The enforcement

officer in the instant case did not ask the appellant
for a place to buy drugs. (T. 26). This fact is
in complete opposition to the requirements of the
Shultz case.

In ShultZ/ the defendant was induced

by the law enforcement officer.
The Shultz standard is also based upon the
consideration that the defendant has no prior association
with the seller that would indicate or give reasonable
inferences that the defendant was acting in concert
with the seller or might receive some form of profit
from the transaction.
In the instant case, an association between
the defendant and the seller was shown.

The

appellant testified that she had purchased heroin
from the seller before (T. 37)

There was also

testimony that the defendant reached in a closed
dresser drawer, while in the hotel room of the seller,
and obtained heroin paraphenelia. (T. 16)

The

defendant testified that she knew the paraphenelia
was in the drawer because she had used it before#
(T. 38)

It is clear from the facts that the defendant

had some type of association with the seller; and
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from that, it can easily, and reasonably be inferred by the trier of fact that there was some
form of compensation available for the defendant.
When all the facts in the instant case
are examined and weighed, it is clear that
appellant's claim of agency does not meet the
Shultz standard.
The trial court, sitting

in the position of

the trier of fact determined that the facts did
not warrant a conclusion in favor of the defense
of agency.

The reviewing court must presume findings

and judgment valid, and review the record most
favorable thereto, and refrain from disturbing them
when substantially supported and require appellant
to show error.

Charlton v. Hackett, 360 P.2d 176,

11 Utah 2d 389. (1961).
To entitle an appellant to prevail, he must
show both error and prejudice, that is,r that his
substantial rights are affected and that there is
at least a fair likelihood that the result would
have been different.

Startin v. Madsen, 237 P.2d

834, 120 Utah 631 (1951).
In the instant case, appellant has failed to
meet both the standard of agency under Utah law
and has failed to rebut the strong presumption in
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favor of the judgment of the trial court and therefore the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
Respondent respectfully submits that appellant
has failed to meet the standard of agency under Utah
law.

To allow the facts of this case to receive the

protection of the defense of agency would produce
a rule so broad that it would create a very dangerous
loophole for those guilty of distributing dangerous
narcotics to escape.

For this reason, the rule of

agency in the Shultz case should be held to a very
strict standard.

Respondent respectfully submits

that the lower court decision should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
EARL P. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Respondent
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